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Laws in Conversation: What the First
Amendment Can Teach Us About Section
230
Haley Griffin*
As the law surrounding regulation of online intermediaries developed, the First Amendment and Section 230 emerged as two central players. Though different bodies of law, their jurisprudence intersects at several points: both display procedural interactions, implicate free speech concerns, apply to intermediaries engaged in
publisher and editorial behaviors, and consider good faith and scienter. However, despite these commonalities, discussion of the First
Amendment and Section 230 has largely been siloed.
This Note places First Amendment and Section 230 jurisprudence in conversation with one another to determine which specific
intermediary behaviors are addressed by each law. Although many
cases discuss “traditional editorial functions,” this Note articulates
that the First Amendment is relevant in only a limited subset of
cases.1 Further, what constitutes a “traditional editorial function”
under Section 230 has expanded significantly since the statute was
first enacted in 1996, creating a problematic paradox.2
In response to the close relationship between the First Amendment and Section 230, this Note proposes courts return their attention to the seminal Section 230 case of Zeran v. America Online,
*

J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2022; B.A. University of
Minnesota: Twin Cities, 2019. I want to thank Professor Olivier Sylvain for inspiring this
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See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); infra Part II.
2
Id.
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Inc. This Note explains how this shift in focus can prevent Section
230’s “traditional editorial” act formulation from swallowing Section 230’s intended scope (taking the First Amendment along with
it). It further encourages courts to adopt the four traditional publisher functions identified by the Fourth Circuit in Zeran: publishing, editing, withdrawing from publication, and postponing publishing. Additionally, this Note suggests courts look to First Amendment
law concerning editorial judgements to elucidate and characterize
truly “traditional” editorial functions.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a social media site engaged in targeted advertising.
This site collects data on users’ actions—the types of content each
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user engages with, the length of time spent on content while scrolling, and even the other sites users visit. The site aggregates this data,
compares it with data taken from other users, and chooses which
advertisements to display to users on its website accordingly. In doing so, the social media site maximizes the efficacy of advertisements it shows to users.
Now imagine this social media site is faced with a lawsuit for a
certain advertisement. After being shown the advertisement, a user
purchased the featured product and was subsequently injured by the
product. Now, the user seeks to sue the social media site for bringing
the product to his attention. It surprises most to realize that, not only
might this social media site assert immunity under a statute enacted
in 1996, but also that it could potentially assert immunity under the
First Amendment as well.
As this example makes apparent, courts currently face a challenging task applying old laws to novel online behaviors. Further,
the legal principles courts apply in these circumstances developed
in the shadow of the modern internet, making it more challenging to
identify what behaviors should and should not be protected. This
Note examines the two biggest players in online intermediary law—
the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) Section 230 and the
First Amendment.3 It compares the application and evolution of
these laws and attempts to identify exactly what constraints do and
should exist for these online actors who play such a central role in
our lives.
Section 230 and the First Amendment are two of the most significant players in the development of the online environment.
These bodies of law frequently intersect with and implicate one another. For instance, free speech values are often raised in discussions
surrounding Section 230, and Section 230 has played a significant
role in shaping how First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved—
or failed to evolve—over time. However, despite the substantial interplay, discussions concerning each of these topics are often siloed.
Further, a comparison of the two bodies of law demonstrates
how Section 230 caselaw evolved to include an affirmative

3

See 47 U.S.C. § 230; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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protection for intermediaries who act as editors—a protection that
has eclipsed, and even outgrown the protection afforded to editors
that already exists under the First Amendment. While none of this
is necessarily problematic on its own, this Note asserts that, because
the protection for editors under Section 230 arose within the context
of online “editing” behavior, this protection has become overly
broad and ambiguously contoured. This creates a risk for conclusory
opinions that frame novel intermediary behaviors as “traditional”
editing behaviors, without seriously inquiring whether a behavior is
truly one “traditionally” performed by an editor.
In Part I, this Note provides background on Section 230 and First
Amendment law in the context of internet speech and identifies the
ways in which each implicates the other. Part II investigates the interplay between Section 230 and the First Amendment, and the discrete ways in which each affects the other. Because intermediaries’
functions influence how they are treated by courts, this Note will
first elucidate six main types of cases involving online intermediaries—ranging from the basic case of an offending third party posting
on a simple online forum, to cases involving algorithms that target
speech to specific individuals. In Part III, this Note proposes that to
provide a definitive limitation on protection for editorial acts, courts
should explicitly ground their analyses of “editorial” behavior in the
language of Zeran v. America Online, Inc., characterizing the traditional publisher functions as “deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”4 Because the Section 230 inquiry
has essentially collapsed into an inquiry of whether the intermediary
has engaged in publisher activity, courts should look to First
Amendment cases involving print and broadcast media to identify
the contours of editor activities under Section 230. Further, Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo may be instructive in defining editorial judgements in the First Amendment context, framing editorial
judgements as, “[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and
the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the
paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—whether
fair or unfair.”5

4
5

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
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I. OUTLINING INTERNET LAW
A. Communications Decency Act, Section 230(c)
1. Background
Section 230’s origins are unexpectedly humble. The statute was
inspired by a New York Supreme Court case, Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy Services Co.6 At the time, Prodigy was a computer network
that hosted an online bulletin board where users gathered to discuss
financial news.7 Individuals could post statements on the bulletin
board and the site encouraged users to abide by Prodigy’s “content
guidelines” when doing so.8 Prodigy would review, edit, and even
remove statements considered offensive or in “bad taste.”9 Indeed,
Prodigy held itself out as a “family-oriented” website.10 However, a
post disparaging a securities investment banking firm, Stratton Oakmont, managed to slip through Prodigy’s controls.11 Stratton Oakmont sued, alleging per se libel.12 The court agreed with Stratton
Oakmont, reasoning that, because Prodigy had gone out of its way
to exert editorial control over the content on its website, it was responsible as a publisher for defamatory content hosted on the site.13
However, members of Congress saw the Prodigy ruling as problematic. They considered how Prodigy was punished for doing a
good thing—going out of its way to screen offensive material to create a family-friendly space online.14 As a result, the drafters of Section 230 took concrete steps to remove the disincentives Stratton
Oakmont placed on intermediaries to regulate offensive third-party

6

Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995); see S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also Zeran,
129 F.3d at 331.
7
See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
8
Id. at *2.
9
Id.
10
Id. at *2, *5.
11
Id. at *2.
12
Id. at *1.
13
Id. at *4.
14
S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
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content.15 Section 230 was ultimately enacted in 1996.16 Section 230
was part of the broader CDA, which criminalized the “knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent” speech to minors.17 Much of
this statute was struck down by the Supreme Court just one year
after its enactment, as is was deemed far too broad a restriction of
free speech under the First Amendment.18 However, Section 230 has
remained intact.19
Section 230(c) provides “[p]rotection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material.”20 As the statute dictates, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”21 The availability of
“Good Samaritan” immunity under this provision turns on whether
the challenged intermediary is an “interactive computer service” or
an “information content provider.”22 Interactive computer services
are entitled to immunity, while information content providers are
not.23 An intermediary is considered an information content provider if it is “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of” the challenged content.24
2. Scope
This section provides a brief overview of the evolution of Section 230 jurisprudence and clarifies the statute’s scope and applicability.

15

Id.
See id.; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
17
Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) (West)).
18
See id. at 857, 867–69.
19
47 U.S.C. § 230.
20
Id. at § 230(c).
21
Id. at § 230(c)(1).
22
See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC., 521 F.3d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
23
Id.
24
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3)).
16
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a) Early Cases Providing Protection to Intermediaries
Section 230(c)’s first application was in the 1997 case of Zeran
v. America Online, Inc., and the statute has been interpreted broadly
since.25 Plaintiff Zeran sued America Online (“AOL”) when a third
party posted inflammatory advertisements on AOL’s bulletin
board.26 The third party falsely attributed these statements to Zeran,
causing an influx of vitriol to Zeran’s home.27 Zeran filed suit, alleging AOL “unreasonably delayed” removing the advertisements
and did not properly monitor for similarly harmful posts going forward.28 AOL asserted Section 230 as a defense.29 The defense was
successful.30 The Fourth Circuit found Zeran’s complaint attempted
to treat the intermediary as a publisher—meaning Section 230
clearly protected AOL.31 Focusing in part on Section 230(b)(2)’s
statement of policy, to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market . . . unfettered by Federal or State Regulation,”32 the court
found AOL not liable.33
One year later in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the D.C. District Court
found Section 230(c) to shield AOL from liability in another defamation action.34 There, AOL posted a news article written by Matt
Drudge to its electronic news board.35 The court relied heavily on
the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Zeran to reach its conclusion.36 Unlike Zeran, where the relationship between the third party and AOL

25

129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997); see Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1179; see also
Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Olivier
Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 213, 246–50 (2018);
Madeline Byrd & Katherine J. Strandburg, CDA 230 for a Smart Internet, 88 FORDHAM L.
REV. 405, 408–09 (2019).
26
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
27
See id.
28
Id. at 328.
29
Id. at 329.
30
Id. at 335.
31
Id. at 333.
32
Id. at 330 (emphasis added by Zeran court) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)).
33
Id. at 335.
34
992 F. Supp. 44, 52–53 (D.D.C. 1998).
35
Id. at 47–48.
36
Id. at 51 (stating that the Zeran court “provided a complete answer to plaintiffs’
primary argument, an answer grounded in the statutory language and intent of Section
230.”).
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was that of a user and a provider,37 here, AOL was in a licensing
agreement with Drudge, paying him $36,000 annually for his content.38 However, despite the lack of anonymity, affiliation, and even
the profitable relationship between Drudge and AOL, the court
found Section 230 conferred immunity on AOL.39
b) Cases Not Providing Protection
i.
Pre-Roommates
In the law’s early years, not all intermediaries asserting Section
230(c) immunity actually received it.40 In the 2006 case of Anthony
v. Yahoo!, Inc., plaintiff Anthony alleged defendant Yahoo! created
fake profiles on Yahoo!’s online dating site “to trick people like Anthony into joining the service and renewing their memberships.”41
Yahoo! also allegedly misled Anthony by maintaining profiles of
former users no longer active on the platform.42 The Northern District of California held that Section 230(c) did not protect Yahoo!.43
Because “[t]he CDA only immunizes ‘information provided by another information content provider,’” Yahoo! was not immunized
for fake profiles it created.44 As for the profiles Yahoo! allegedly
wrongfully maintained, the plaintiff attempted to hold Yahoo! liable
for misrepresentations accompanying the profiles—rather than the
profiles themselves—and Section 230 did not apply.45
The way the court in Anthony distinguished between a third
party’s protected content and an intermediary’s unprotected affirmative acts foreshadowed the rationale for the material contribution
test to come.
ii.
Post-Roommates: The Material Contribution Test
The material contribution test provides courts with a concrete
way to determine when intermediaries’ conduct strays outside
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330–31.
Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 51.
Id. at 52–53.
See infra notes 41–45.
421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1263.
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
See id.
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Section 230’s shield. The test is premised on the idea that Section
230 does not shield intermediaries from liability if they participate
in the “development” of unlawful content.46 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC first set forth the test, stating:
[W]e interpret the term “development” as referring
not merely to augmenting the content generally, but
to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to
[S]ection 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.47
Since its inception, the material contribution exception has been
employed in a variety of contexts.48 For instance, in Doe v. Internet
Brands, Inc., the Ninth Circuit determined that attempting to hold a
defendant intermediary liable for negligent failure to warn did not
treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker of user content, meaning Section 230 did apply.49 In Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, platform Roommates.com’s requirement that users answer screening questions pertaining to protected identities under the Fair Housing Act (such as age, sexual orientation, and family status) as a condition of using their platform
constituted a material contribution to the site’s illegality.50 This
meant Section 230 did not protect Roommates.com’s use of their
questionnaire.51
In Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Ninth Circuit’s opinion never specifically used the words, “material contribution,” but nonetheless
looked to whether the plaintiff attempted to treat the defendant intermediary as a “publisher or speaker.”52 The court affirmed the

46

Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC., 521 F.3d
1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2008).
47
See id. (emphasis added).
48
See, e.g., infra notes 49–53.
49
824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016).
50
521 F.3d at 1169–70.
51
See id. at 1165.
52
570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009).
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lower court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss as to a negligent
undertaking claim, but reversed on the promissory estoppel claim.53
B. First Amendment Case Law
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
the right to free speech, stating, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”54 Many may think of the First
Amendment as a bedrock principle of American jurisprudence.
However, as Tim Wu highlights, the First Amendment only rose to
prominence beginning in the early twentieth century.55 First Amendment jurisprudence is rooted in the context of safeguarding political
speech, especially political criticism.56 However, it has since expanded to encompass the speech of corporations, including corporate speech aimed at selling products to consumers.57 A brief explanation of First Amendment law follows to provide context for the
discussion of the First Amendment rights of online intermediaries in
Part II.
1. Commercial Speech Generally
Commercial speech—“speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction”58—is protected by the First Amendment.59
As the Supreme Court stated in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, “speech does not lose its
First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as
in a paid advertisement.”60 The protection for commercial speech is

53

See id. at 1105–06, 1109.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55
See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Sept.
1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendment-obsolete [https://
perma.cc/5D2K-RQKB].
56
See id.
57
See infra notes 58–60.
58
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
59
Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
60
Id.
54
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theoretically less broad than the protection available for political
speech. However, in recent times, First Amendment protections for
advertisements have become increasingly robust and apparent.61
In Sorrell v. IMS Health, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to answer the question of whether a law infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of pharmaceutical sales companies.62 The law
prohibited: (1) “pharmacies, health insurers, and similar entities
from selling prescriber-identifying information, absent the prescriber’s consent”; and (2) “pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers” from using “prescriber-identifying information for marketing . . . unless the prescriber consents.”63 The
Court found this law placed an “aimed, content-based burden”64 on
specific actors known as detailers—pharmaceutical manufacturer
employees who use patient information to improve sales and marketing activities.65 Because the statute limited the detailers’ access
to the data they required to perform their jobs, the detailers’ speech
had been impermissibly burdened. 66 Accordingly, heightened scrutiny was required. 67
a) Editorial Judgments
Editorial judgments are a type of commercial speech that receive
First Amendment protections.68 Simply put, editorial judgment is
the discretion exercised by publishers (traditionally newspapers and
printing processes) throughout the course of the editorial process.69
The protection for editorial judgments arose from a series of cases
involving compelled speech in print and television media. In a seminal compelled-speech case, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo, the plaintiff newspaper challenged the constitutionality of

61

See infra notes 78–88.
564 U.S. 552, 561–62 (2011).
63
Id. at 559.
64
Id. at 564.
65
Id. at 558.
66
Id. at 564.
67
Id. at 565–66.
68
See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 391
(1973).
69
See id. at 386.
62
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a right-of-reply statute.70 The statute in question required newspapers that “assailed . . . [the] personal character” of a political candidate to print the reply of the attacked candidate in “as conspicuous
a place” as the original article and without charge if the candidate
requested.71 In striking down the statute as violative of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court stated: “[t]he choice of material to
go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and
public officials—whether fair or unfair—constitute the exercise of
editorial control and judgment.”72
Courts have considered the concept of editorial judgments outside the context of newspapers as well—for example, in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,73 a case involving broadcasting
systems, and in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston,74 a case involving the curation of a St. Patrick’s
Day parade. Courts have recognized that online intermediaries can
engage in editorial judgments as well, and are thus sometimes
awarded First Amendment protection for their editorial judgments.75
b) The Public Forum Doctrine
The public forum doctrine provides that a private entity can be
liable for violating an individual’s First Amendment rights if the private entity’s functions are sufficiently similar to that of a public entity.76 This definition first originated in the 1946 case of Marsh v.
Alabama, in which the Supreme Court held that a corporation operating a company town violated a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses’
First Amendment rights when it barred distribution of religious literature in the town’s streets.77 In more recent years, some have posited that a similar rule should apply to social media companies

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

418 U.S. 241, 241 (1974).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 258.
512 U.S. 622, 622 (1994).
515 U.S. 557, 575–76 (1995).
See, e.g., Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
See Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554–55 (9th Cir. 2002).
326 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1946).
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because they represent “the new ‘public squares’ of the internet
age.”78 In the case of Prager University v. Google, LLC, conservative media organization PragerU brought suit alleging First Amendment violations when several of its videos were tagged as only appropriate for restricted mode, or were otherwise demonetized on
YouTube (a Google subsidiary).79 The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected this argument, distinguishing the sweeping role of the company town in Marsh from the comparatively limited function of
YouTube.80 Although in recent years conservatives have begun
pushing for this conceptualization of the First Amendment in the
social media context, progressives have long expressed similar concerns regarding the power private entities now exert over citizens’
First Amendment rights.81
The limited applicability of the public forum doctrine is exemplified in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck.82 In this
case, the plaintiffs claimed injury when the Manhattan Neighborhood Network (“MNN”) “temporarily suspended Halleck from using the public access channels” after MNN was forced to “field[]
multiple complaints about the film’s content.”83 Although MNN
was technically a private entity, it appeared to have a public quality
as well.84 New York State law required cable operators to “set aside
channels on their cable systems for public access,” and required
these public access channels to be free and available on a “firstcome, first-served” basis.85 The cable operators running the public
access channels were allowed to designate a private entity to operate
them—MNN was that private entity.86 Plaintiffs asserted that MNN
was engaged in a specifically public function, and therefore should

78

Genevieve Lakier, The Great Free-Speech Reversal, ATLANTIC (Jan. 27, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/01/first-amendment-regulation/617827/
[https://perma.cc/8NJS-HKSV] (quoting Senator John Cornyn).
79
951 F.3d 991, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2020).
80
See id. at 998.
81
See Lakier, supra note 78.
82
139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019).
83
Id. at 1927.
84
Id. at 1926.
85
Id. (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 16, §§ 895.1(f), 895.4(b), (c)(4), (6)
(2018)).
86
See id. at 1926–27 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES, R. & REGS. tit. 16 § 895.4(c)(1) (2018)).
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qualify as a state actor for purposes of the plaintiff’s First Amendment suit.87 Despite this assertion, the Court declined to hold that
MNN fell into the narrow category of entities that are both private
and subject to liability as state actors.88
One recent development hinting at an expanded role for the public forum doctrine is Justice Thomas’ concurrence in the Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari in Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University.89 Plaintiffs sued then-president Donald Trump for blocking their access to Trump’s Twitter account.90
Plaintiffs asserted that Trump’s Twitter account was a public forum
and, as a result, their First Amendment rights were violated when
they were prohibited from interacting with the online space.91 Justice Thomas did not accept the plaintiffs’ position without reservation.92 However, he did use his concurrence to explore the ways in
which digital platforms may be assigned liability for stifling
speech—one being treatment as a common carrier,93 and the other
being treatment as a place of public accommodation.94 While these
two conceptualizations of liability have yet to be explored by case
law, Justice Thomas’ concurrence may certainly spark further development in this area.
C. Algorithms
1. Protection for Intermediaries Employing Algorithms
Online intermediaries may receive protection for their use of algorithms under Section 230, the First Amendment, or both. Before
examining the state of the law and scholarship surrounding algorithmic results, it is helpful to define the concept of algorithms and explain what is encompassed in algorithmic activity.
87
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a) Types of Algorithms
In her article, Platforms, The First Amendment and Online
Speech: Regulating the Filters, Sofia Grafanaki provides a useful
set of definitions for algorithms.95 Grafanaki identifies two main categories of algorithms: content moderation algorithms and content
navigation algorithms.96 Content moderation algorithms address
“whether content is allowed to exist on the platform.”97 One such
algorithm may, for instance, screen and block content that violates
a website’s terms of use.98 Alternatively, content navigation algorithms are algorithms that actively assist user interactions with a
site.99 Content navigation algorithms can be further broken down
into two subcategories: “algorithms that select content that is trending” and “personalization algorithms.”100 Algorithms that select
trending content promote content with which the public at large has
already engaged.101 Personalization algorithms, on the other hand,
use information gathered to create digital approximations of each
individual.102 Approximation algorithms then pair individuals with
content that other similarly-situated users also enjoyed.103
2. Section 230’s Treatment of Algorithms
a) A Brief Overview
The Second Circuit’s decision in Force v. Facebook was the
most recent decision analyzing algorithmic activity under Section
230.104 There, the plaintiffs brought federal anti-terrorism claims
against Facebook when members of their families were killed by
agents of Hamas.105 The plaintiffs sought to hold Facebook liable
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See Sofia Grafanaki, Platforms, the First Amendment and Online Speech: Regulating
the Filters, 39 PACE L. REV. 111, 137 (2018).
96
Id.
97
Id. at 138.
98
See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 626 (D. Del. 2007).
99
See Grafanaki, supra note 95, at 141.
100 Id. at 151.
101 See id. at 118.
102 See id. at 155–56.
103
See id. at 156.
104 934 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2019).
105
Id.

2022]

LAWS IN CONVERSATION

489

for their family members’ deaths, asserting that Hamas used the
platform to recruit new members and incite action in current members.106 Among other things, plaintiffs attempted to hold Facebook
responsible for its “matchmaking” function, which “uses algorithms
to suggest content to users.”107 Examples of this algorithmic “matchmaking” included Facebook’s “friend suggestions,” which are
“based on analysis of users’ existing social connections on Facebook and other behavioral or demographic data,” as well as Facebook’s use of targeted advertising.108
The Second Circuit found Facebook’s matchmaking activities to
be “publisher” activities, and thus, were shielded by Section
230(c).109 To frame Facebook’s activities in this light, the court reasoned that making “connections . . . among speakers, content, and
viewers of content,” is an essential function of online publishers.110
As such, the court reasoned the immunity of Section 230(c) should
not give way simply because a publisher has “become especially
adept at performing the functions of publishers.”111
Facebook found additional refuge in the material contribution
test.112 The court noted that Facebook was not responsible for “developing” third-party content for a few reasons.113 First, the court
noted that Facebook did not “edit (or suggest edits) for the content
that its users . . . publish[ed].”114 Second, following the D.C. Circuit’ reasoning in Marshall’s Locksmith Service v. Google, the court
found that the algorithms Facebook employed were content neutral.115 Third, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ assertion that the algorithms making content more “visible, available, and usable”
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See id. at 57, 59.
Id. at 65.
108 Id.
109
See id. at 66.
110 Id.
111
Id. at 67; see also id. at 70 (describing these functions as ones “Facebook believes
will cause the user to use Facebook as much as possible”) (internal quotations omitted).
112 See id. at 69 (internal quotations omitted).
113 See id. at 69–70.
114 Id.
115
Id. at 70 (meaning by “content neutral” that they did not discriminate based on the
content with which they interacted); see also Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., Inc. v. Google,
LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1267–68 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
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constituted a development of information under Section
230(f)(3).116 In the same vein, the court found that Facebook’s possible intentions behind employing these algorithms, including showing users content to increase engagement, were simply an “essential
part of traditional publishing.”117
In his dissent, Justice Katzmann presented a hypothetical to illustrate why he disagreed with the majority’s reasoning:
Suppose that you are a published author. One day, an
acquaintance calls. “I’ve been reading over everything you’ve ever published,” he informs you. “I’ve
also been looking at everything you’ve ever said on
the Internet. I’ve done the same for this other author.
You two have very similar interests; I think you’d get
along.” The acquaintance then gives you the other
author’s contact information and photo, along with a
link to all her published works. He calls back three
more times over the next week with more names of
writers you should get to know.
Now, you might say your acquaintance fancies himself a matchmaker. But would you say he’s acting as the publisher of the other
author’s work?118
Justice Katzmann believed that the majority, based on their reasoning, would be forced to agree this hypothetical individual is a
publisher.119 He, on the other hand, would not.120 Justice Katzmann
was not alone in his skepticism over the majority’s application of
Section 230. In the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Group, USA, LLC, Justice Thomas
identified a number of cases that have interpreted Section 230
broadly, conferring “sweeping immunity” on the affected intermediaries.121 Without deciding anything, Thomas warned that
“[e]xtending [Section] 230 immunity beyond the natural reading of

116
117
118
119
120
121

Force, 934 F.3d at 70 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 76 (Katzmann, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See id.
See id.
141 S. Ct. 13, 13, 18 (2020).
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the text can have serious consequences,” and foreshadowed that “in
an appropriate case, it behooves [the Supreme Court] to” decide the
correct interpretation of Section 230.122
In reaching its decision, the court in Force v. Facebook referenced Carafano v. Metrosplash.com.123 This Ninth Circuit case
arose when an unknown person created an internet dating service
profile pretending to be the plaintiff.124 The offender used this fraudulent profile to elicit sexually and physically threatening communications from other individuals online.125 The court found the defendant website not liable for appropriation of the right of publicity, defamation, and negligence on Section 230(c) grounds.126 The court
rested heavily on the fact that website users were the ones inputting
the information to the website’s elicited questions.127 It specifically
noted that, although users did generate content only after being
prompted by the website’s introductory questionnaire, users were
still given full control over the selection of content.128
b) First Amendment
Regarding whether algorithmic outputs specifically should be
protected speech under the First Amendment, case law is relatively
limited.129 However, there are a few notable cases that have set the
tone for the debate to follow.
In SearchKing, Inc. v. Google, Technology, Inc., the District
Court tackled the question of “whether a representation of the relative significance of a web site as it corresponds to a search query is

122

Id. at 18.
Force, 934 F.3d at 66–67 (referencing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d
1119 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121.
125 Id.
126
Id. at 1125.
127 See id. at 1124.
128 See id.
129 For examples of the only other cases at the time which addressed whether the First
Amendment protects algorithmic outputs, see, e.g., Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp.
3d 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del.
2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
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a form of protected speech.”130 Plaintiff website SearchKing alleged
their PageRank—the number assigned by defendant Google indicating a particular site’s relevancy and responsiveness to a given
query—was improperly lowered from a high of two, to a low of “no
rank.”131 Addressing whether Google’s PageRank was a protected
opinion under the First Amendment, the court evaluated the distinction between an algorithm’s results and the algorithm itself.132 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the algorithm behind the
PageRank system was objective (in that it is a replicable, fixed system) and accordingly should not be considered an opinion.133 It instead accepted Google’s framing, that an algorithm turns on a subjective evaluation of various factors to arrive at its ultimate results.134 However, not all accept the District Court’s analysis in this
case.135
Subsequently, a New York district court faced a distinct but related issue in Zhang v. Baidu.com.136 There, the plaintiff alleged his
content was being blocked by Chinese language search engine, defendant Baidu.137 The complaint further alleged that Baidu was engaged in targeting and blocking pro-democracy content.138 Rather
than alleging Baidu was a neutral conduit, the court noted that plaintiffs specifically sought to hold Baidu liable for consciously choosing to favor certain political opinions over others.139 Because the
complaint was addressed to the latter “editorial judgments,” it was
dismissed on First Amendment grounds.140
In E-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., a Florida district
court accepted the argument that Google’s PageRanks and removal
of sites from search results altogether was equivalent to “decisions
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2003 WL 21464568, at *1.
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Id. at *3.
133 Id. at *4.
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Id. at *3–4.
135 See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1528 (2013) (characterizing
Search King as “an unpublished dismissal with limited precedential value”).
136 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
137 Id. at 435.
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by a newspaper editor regarding which content to publish, which
article belongs on the front page, and which article is unworthy of
publication,” and thus protected by the First Amendment as a “fundamental” matter.141 Part III of this Note will conduct a closer look
at similar case law.
D. Similarities Between Section 230 and the First Amendment
The laws surrounding the First Amendment and Section 230(c)
have several key conceptual intersections. Section 230(c) has been
recognized as implicating First Amendment concerns142 and vice
versa.143 This Note will use the parallels between these two bodies
of law to propose a solution to the ambiguous and expansive coverage currently afforded by Section 230.
1. Procedural interaction
One way in which Section 230 and the First Amendment interact
is on a baseline, procedural level. In his article lauding Section 230
as “[b]etter [t]han the First Amendment,” Eric Goldman distinguishes Section 230’s protections from those afforded by the First
Amendment.144 Standing against those who assert that Section 230
is “redundant with the First Amendment,”145 Goldman asserts Section 230 offers extra procedural benefits to affected intermediaries,
in addition to its substantive benefits.146
Framing Section 230 as a statute that “enhance[s]” free speech
protections afforded by the First Amendment,147 Goldman highlights five procedural advantages that intermediaries receive from
the statute: (1) facilitating dismissal earlier in the litigation process;
(2) providing a higher degree of predictability for litigants than under the First Amendment; (3) preventing plaintiff plead-arounds; (4)
141

No. 2:14-cv-646-FtM-PAM-CM, 2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017).
Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad
Samaritans § 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 407 (2017).
143 Cary Glynn, Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027,
2028 (2018).
144 Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 N
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DAME L. REV. REFLECTION 33, 33 (2019).
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Id. at 34.
146 Id. at 34–35.
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Id. at 35.
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mooting conflicts of law at the state level; and (5) facilitating constitutional avoidance.148
The broad, additional layer of protection for intermediaries under Section 230 is not enthusiastically endorsed by all. By providing
this procedural shield, Section 230 has foreclosed the judiciary from
a meaningful opportunity to shape the law surrounding intermediaries’ interactions with user content.149 In this way, one may argue
Section 230’s procedural shield has caused the related First Amendment law to sit underdeveloped, inhibiting opportunities for the judiciary to address arguably more salient speech and technology-related issues.
2. Policy Concerns with Speech
Courts have been quick to associate Section 230 with the First
Amendment’s free speech values.150 In Zeran v. America Online,
Inc., the court highlighted Congress’ “desire to promote unfettered
speech on the Internet” in deciding to grant immunity to intermediary AOL.151 Other courts have taken up this theme as well in granting Section 230 immunity to intermediaries.152 Some scholars go a
step further than the courts, arguing that Section 230 is, in fact, necessitated by, or redundant of, the First Amendment in the context
of defamation.153
However, the courts’ conflation of Section 230 and First
Amendment values is not without its critics.154 Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks point to the fact that one of Section
230(b)(4)’s policy goals include “remov[ing] disincentives for the
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Id. at 39–44.
See Olivier Sylvain, Recovering Tech’s Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 252, 253,
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129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997).
152 See, e.g., Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 23.
153 See, e.g., Glynn, note 143, at 2028; Julio Sharp-Wasserman, Section 230(c)(1) of the
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development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies,”
arguing against this now-common practice of equating Section 230
with the First Amendment.155
Furthermore, there is the separate but related observation that
“unfettered” speech online does not necessarily mean valuable, First
Amendment-protected speech is being maximized.156 Raising the
phenomena of “troll armies,” “flooding,” and “propaganda robots,”
Tim Wu asserts the antiquated assumptions that form the basis of
First Amendment jurisprudence are ill-equipped to address online
speech attempting to silence politically controversial speech.157 Invoking the contrast between attention scarcity and the unlimited
supply of speech that exists today, Wu observes how an abundance
of speech can be, and is weaponized to silence competing viewpoints—a phenomena foreign to the twentieth-century environment
in which First Amendment jurisprudence was developed.158
Regardless of these considerations, scholars and the public alike
are still quick to associate the policy considerations behind Section
230 with the First Amendment.159 This association informs the debate about proposed reforms to Section 230. For instance, some see
the Protecting Americans from Dangerous Algorithms Act
(“PADAA”)—a piece of legislation which would repeal Section 230
immunity for amplification of harmful speech—as sufficient to trigger First Amendment scrutiny.160 Other recent efforts to reform Section 230 have been met with similar concerns.161
155
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3. Application to Publishers and Editors
Another similarity between Section 230 and the First Amendment is the laws’ conceptualization of online intermediaries within
the framework of publishers, editors, or sometimes both. In the context of the Section 230(c), “Good Samaritan” blockers cannot be
treated as the “publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”162 In the First Amendment
context, this takes the form of protection for editorial judgments.163
These separate inquiries have tended to blend in practice. From the
beginning, the court in Zeran found Section 230 bars “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish,
withdraw, postpone, or alter content.”164 More recently, the court in
Force v. Facebook considered whether Facebook engaged in editing
when deciding whether Facebook had materially contributed to the
content’s alleged illegality for purposes of immunity under Section
230.165 Additionally, Citron and Franks emphasize the importance
of only allowing providers treated as “publishers” or “speakers” to
receive immunity.166
4. Good Faith and Scienter
Section 230 does not have a scienter requirement.167 This differs
from First Amendment case law; in the publishing context, the First
Amendment inquiry turns in part on a distributing intermediary’s
knowledge.168 However, recently, some have questioned whether inquiring into the knowledge, or more broadly, into the mindset of the

content [https://perma.cc/2BAB-LQCA] (addressing First Amendment concerns with the
PACT Act).
162 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 386
(1973).
164 Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).
165 934 F.3d 53, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2019).
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defendant intermediary may be appropriate for achieving a more equitable outcome in Section 230 cases.169
In the traditional, non-online setting, the First Amendment analysis for defamation liability differs depending upon whether the defendant entity is considered a “publisher” or a “distributer.”170 In the
case of publishers, if a principal-agent relationship exists between
the creator of the defamatory content and the printer or seller of the
content, the principal may be found liable for the defamatory content.171 However, in Smith v. People of the State of California, the
Supreme Court struck down an ordinance instituting strict liability
for booksellers possessing “any obscene or indecent writing, (or)
book.”172 As Michael Spencer explains in his scholarship, the court
reasoned that the ordinance tended “to hinder the freedoms of
speech and press,” and ultimately found it could not stand.173 As a
result, a distinction was drawn between distributors, who are only
liable for defamation if they “know or ha[ve] reason to know of its
defamatory character,” and publishers, who are liable regardless of
whether they know or have reason to know of the defamatory nature
of the content at issue.174 This distinction still persists for those operating in print media.175
However, in the context of Section 230 and online service providers, the distinction between distributors and publishers was
erased by the court in Zeran.176 The court found there was nothing
in Prodigy or Cubby v. CompuServe to support distinguishing distributors from publishers under defamation law, thus collapsing that
preexisting distinction for intermediaries claiming immunity under
Section 230.177
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See infra notes 170–175.
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While it is true that Section 230 does not explicitly inquire into
the challenged intermediary’s mindset or knowledge, some have
highlighted the title of Section 230(c), “Protection for Good Samaritan Blockers,” as a potential foothold for judicial reform.178 Proponents suggest courts use Section 230(c)’s title—which refers to
“Good Samaritan blocking and filtering of offensive content”179—
as a “‘tool[] available for the resolution of doubt’ about the meaning
of the statute” to find Section 230(c) should apply exclusively to
those who engage in good faith efforts to filter out illegal content.180
Although Section 230 jurisprudence has, for the most part, excluded
intermediaries’ intentions and knowledge from the legal analysis,
such considerations may come into play again if these suggestions
for reform begin to see traction.
5. Next Steps Based on Section 230 and the First
Amendment’s Intersections
Considering both the legal uncertainty regarding treatment of intermediaries’ algorithmic activities, and the similarities between
Section 230(c) and the First Amendment on this issue, this Note proposes a solution based on a nuanced comparison of both bodies of
law. Conversation about the relationship between the First Amendment and Section 230 has been largely limited to a debate over Section 230’s implications on the First Amendment, and how proposed
Section 230 reform should accordingly respond. This Note proposes
a different trajectory. Instead, these seemingly-problematic similarities can be used constructively. By drawing on both First Amendment and Section 230 case law, this proposed solution articulates a
fresh understanding of intermediaries’ functions and roles, and what
that means for both First Amendment and Section 230 jurisprudence
and scholarship going forward.
To begin, this Note will more closely compare and contrast the
conceptualization of intermediaries engaging in algorithmic activities as publisher/editors in both contexts to identify trends and places
178

See Mary Anne Franks, How the Internet Unmakes Law, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 10,
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of agreement and disagreement. Then, it will use the synthesis of
these two bodies of law and scholarship to propose how courts and
the legislature should understand whether algorithmic outputs are
protected by the First Amendment going forward.
II. WHAT A COMPARISON OF SECTION 230 AND FIRST AMENDMENT
CASES ILLUSTRATES
A. Types of Online Intermediary Cases
Cases addressing online intermediary behaviors can be divided
into six general categories. Because these behaviors shape how
courts treat intermediaries, it is useful to identify and categorize
them at the outset. This creates a framework for analyzing Section
230’s and the First Amendment’s applications across a variety of
cases with a special focus on algorithmic activities.
The first category concerns cases that seek to hold the defendant
liable for third-party content posted on a straight forward forum or
message board.181 The second category includes cases where an intermediary is sued for its use of an electronic form—that is, a premade template for third-party speech.182 The third, fourth, and fifth
categories primarily concern algorithmic behavior, and include, respectively: (1) cases in which the intermediary has performed minor
editorial acts;183 (2) cases involving content navigation algorithms
in the search result placement context;184 and (3) cases involving
content personalization algorithms.185 The final category concerns
cases in which an intermediary has engaged in content moderation—either by hand or by algorithm—resulting in delisting a plaintiff from its collection of search engine results.186 This Part will
begin by taking each type of Section 230 case in turn, noting how
Section 230 and the First Amendment are applied to each subset of
cases, and will end by identifying a problematic feature of Section

181
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See cases cited infra notes 187–197.
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230 jurisprudence, made apparent by a First Amendment comparison.
1. Postings on an Online Forum
The most canonical Section 230 cases are those where an intermediary is sued for hosting offensive third-party content on a simple, forum-like online space. The first of these cases, filed just over
a month after Section 230 became law, was Zeran v. America
Online, Inc., discussed above, involving an early online “bulletin
board.”187
Jones v. Dirty World involved an online gossip forum.188 The
owner and operator of the website, defendant Nik Lamas-Richie, edited each submission to his website before it was posted (deleting
“nudity, obscenity, threats of violence, profanity, and racial slurs,”)
and would post a “one-line comment . . . with ‘some sort of humorous or satirical observation.’”189 He also responded to user comments as himself.190 The court found that Section 230 protected
Richie for both his deletions and his personal comments on the
posts.191 Expressing the reasoning behind its decision, the court repeatedly stated its belief that one of Section 230’s primary purposes
is promoting free speech on the internet.192 However, the First
Amendment itself was never mentioned in the court’s analysis.193
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See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text; see also Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570
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In cases involving third-party or intermediary postings on
straight forward online fora, Section 230 rules the day.194 In some
of these cases, the First Amendment, or free speech concerns in general, are never mentioned.195 In others, like Jones v. Dirty World,
free speech considerations receive significant attention.196 Still in
others, courts will mention the First Amendment and free speech
concerns only fleetingly.197 However, there has yet to be a case
where the First Amendment is raised as a defense in and of itself as
a response to these suits.
2. Electronic Forms
Similar to above are the cases where an intermediary faces the
prospect of liability for operating an electronic form or template. In
these cases, an intermediary has employed a set of either free-form
or limited-response prompts, which third parties have utilized in
committing tortious acts against the plaintiffs. The most obvious example of this type of case is Roommates.com.198 Interestingly,
Roommates.com did raise the First Amendment as a defense for
their action.199 However, the court, having already decided the case
on the basis of Section 230, declined to take up this argument.200
Not all intermediaries who solicit responses through online
forms have been found liable for their actions. For instance, in Carafano v. Metrosplash, the offending third party misused the “essay
section” of defendant’s questionnaire—however, the court held that
the plaintiff’s claims were barred by Section 230.201 Although
194

See id.
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197
See generally, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F.
App’x 586 (2d Cir. 2019).
198 Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1169–70, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008).
199 See Appellant Roommate.Com, LLC’s Third Brief on Cross Appeal at 28,
Roommate.Com, LLC. v. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley, 666 F.3d 1216 (9th
Cir. 2012) (No. 09-55272), 2010 WL 2751575.
200 Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1175 n.40.
201
See 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Matchmaker.com did contribute some to the unlawful content by
providing the questionnaire’s structure, Matchmaker.com was still
not liable because it was not responsible for the “underlying misinformation.”202
Taking the existing case law into consideration, when an intermediary faces potential liability for the way a third party used their
electronic form, Section 230 appears to dominate, and little attention, if any, will be paid to First Amendment concerns.
3. Algorithm Cases
As mentioned above, Grafanaki identified three main categories
of algorithms—content moderation algorithms,203 content navigation algorithms,204 and content personalization algorithms.205 However, there is a fourth set of algorithms courts have recognized,
dubbed “automated editorial acts.”206 This section will focus first on
these “automated editorial acts,” and will then examine content navigation and personalization algorithms. Content moderation algorithms and functions will then be discussed in a separate section.207
a) Automated Editorial Acts
In many Section 230 cases, the challenged intermediary is sued
for employing an algorithm. These algorithms do not always fit
squarely into the boxes of “content moderation,” “content navigation,” or “content personalization.” Rather, they are commonly used
algorithms that perform small “editorial” tasks.
Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., involved one such algorithm.208 There,
plaintiffs alleged that defendants had created a star-based rating system and should therefore be held responsible as the “author” of a
202

Id.; see also Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(finding Section 230 protected defendant website, after an offending third party completed
an electronic form in such a way that incorrectly indicated that the plaintiff’s business fell
into the category of “Entertainers—Adult,” without mentioning the First Amendment or
free speech concerns).
203 Grafanaki, supra note 95, at 138.
204 Id. at 141.
205 Id. at 151.
206
O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016).
207 See infra notes 237–253 and accompanying text.
208
Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 (9th Cir. 2016).
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one-star rating made by a disgruntled customer.209 However, the
court granted defendants immunity under Section 230 for any harm
resulting from this act, finding that because the rating system was a
“neutral tool” operating on “voluntary inputs,” the same reasoning
from Roommates.com applied.210
Other similar, “automated editorial acts” include formatting
text,211 and creating “star symbols” and “Power Sellers” designations.212 These are acts performed by algorithms that slightly alter
or add to the complained-of third-party content.213 But because these
acts are completed by a “neutral algorithm” and act merely as neutral conduits for third-party information,214 they are deemed “editorial acts,” falling within the scope of Section 230’s protection.215
In these cases, although the language of “editors” is used
throughout, little-to-no mention is made of the First Amendment.216
However, as is usually the case when Section 230 is involved, courts
may briefly mention free speech concerns traditionally associated
with the law.217
b) Search Result Placement
The First Amendment law on the issue of intermediary liability
is more developed in cases where the contested conduct pertains to
content’s relevance to the world at large. One of the more notable
cases in this vein is Search King.218 There, as discussed above, the
209

Id. at 1266–67.
Id. at 1270 (quoting Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v.
Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding Section 230 protected
defendants Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! for their roles in taking alphanumeric addresses
provided by offending third parties and translating them into pinpoints on a map, rejecting
the argument that this act constituted an impermissible “development” by the websites).
211
O’Kroley, 831 F.3d at 355.
212 Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 703, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
213
Id.
214 Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., 925 F.3d at 1271 (quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753
F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
215 O’Kroley, 831 F.3d at 355.
216 See cases cited in supra notes 211–215.
217
See, e.g., Kimzey v. Yelp!, Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2016).
218 Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
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plaintiff Search King sued when Google decreased its “PageRank,”219 adversely affecting Search King’s business opportunities.220 Distinguishing between an algorithm’s objective, codedriven processes and the subjective value judgment associated with
the ultimate output, the court found “PageRanks are opinions—
opinions of the significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a search query,”221 thus entitled to full First Amendment
protections.222
In general, courts have expressed willingness to accept this decision’s conclusion about search engine results and the First Amendment.223 Interestingly, however, the court in Search King was never
called on to address,224 and did not address, whether Section 230
provided immunity for Google’s PageRank system.225 Notable too
is the fact that the Search King court, and courts following its footsteps, accepted the results as opinions wholesale, without relying on
the decision on relevance being an “editorial” judgment.226
c) Personalization Algorithms
Similar to content navigation algorithms are content personalization algorithms.227 Instead of promoting or amplifying content the
intermediary deems relevant to all, these algorithms promote content to particular users based on information the intermediary has
obtained about the user’s interests and habits.228 If content navigation algorithms are opinions on the relevance of a particular result
to their audience at large, one could argue that content
219

Id. at *1.
Id.
221 Id. at *4.
222
Id. (quoting Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs., Inc., 175
F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999)).
223
See, e.g., e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274
(M.D. Fla. 2016) (“The Court has little quarrel with the cases cited . . . for the proposition
that search engine output results are protected by the First Amendment.”).
224 See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Supporting Brief, Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30, 2002), 2002 WL 32387991.
225 See generally Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003)
226
Id.
227 See Grafanaki, supra note 95, at 151.
228
See id.
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personalization algorithms are opinions on the relevance of results
to particular users.
One case where this type of algorithm took center stage was the
aforementioned case of Force v. Facebook.229 The plaintiffs alleged
Facebook engaged in unlawful activity facilitated by “algorithms to
suggest content to users, resulting in ‘matchmaking.’”230 The court
reasoned that this matchmaking function fell squarely within the
gambit of editorial decisions.231 In doing so, the court characterized
algorithmic matchmaking as simply an automated version of the decision to display particular third-party content to certain groups
based on certain characteristics of those groups—the mere automation of an editorial decision.232
Even though Facebook’s actions were clear “editorial
choices,”233 an opinion on relevance was pleaded and admitted to,
and apparent similarities existed between the relevancy opinion seen
in Search King sixteen years prior,234 the court never mentioned the
First Amendment.235 The case was decided purely on whether the
matchmaking activity was an editorial decision under Section
230.236
d) Content Moderation
Finally, there is the class of cases brought when an intermediary
delists a plaintiff’s website from their platform, usually due to a
terms of use violation.237 If this process were to take place via algorithm, the algorithm performing the task would be what Grafanaki
calls a “content moderation algorithm.”238 However, in practice, the

229

See supra notes 105–128 and accompanying text.
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 65 (2d Cir. 2019).
231 Id. at 66 (reasoning intermediaries made these decisions “since the early days of the
[i]nternet”).
232 Id. at 66–67.
233
See id. at 67.
234 See e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D.
Fla. 2016).
235 See generally Force, 934 F.3d. 53.
236 Id. at 57.
237
See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (D. Del. 2007); Bennett
v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
238
See Grafanaki, supra note 95, at 138–39.
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cases seen so far are directed at manual removals by intermediaries
who have specifically singled out the plaintiff for delisting.239 There
is certainly a temptation to lump these cases together with the other
search engine cases. However, these cases are distinct from cases
like Search King, which are based on opinions about relevance.240
This is because these cases contain an objectively verifiable statement—whether or not the terms of use have been violated—as opposed to a subjective opinion on relative relevance.
James Grimmelmann took up the question of subjective and objective falsity in his article, Speech Engines.241 He explained that
subjective falsity is at issue if an advisor asserts that a specific website will be most relevant to a viewer, when in fact, the advisor
knows that a different recommendation would be more relevant.242
It is telling a lie about a subjective fact. Objective falsity would be
at issue if the advisor told the viewer that a recommendation was
freely given, when in fact, it was paid for handsomely by an advertising company. This would be a lie about an objective truth.243 Subjective falsity is at issue in Search King and Force v. Facebook; objective falsity is at issue in the content moderation cases.
For content moderation cases, the law has seen a mixed bag of
Section 230 and First Amendment immunity for intermediaries.244
One content moderation case is the previously mentioned case of
Baidu.245 There, Chinese-language search engine Baidu was sued

239

See, e.g., Langdon, 474 F. Supp. at 626; Bennett, 882 F.3d at 1165.
See Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568,
at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (finding “PageRanks are opinions—opinions of the
significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a search query” and that “there is
no conceivable way to prove that the relative significance assigned to a given web site is
false.”).
241 James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 M
INN. L. REV. 868, 923, 926 (2014).
242
Id. at 926.
243 See id. at 923.
244
See generally, e.g., e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265
(M.D. Fla. 2016) (finding no CDA immunity, but First Amendment protection for
defendant intermediary in a content moderation case); see also Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d
622 (finding CDA immunity and First Amendment protection for a defendant intermediary
in a content moderation case); Bennett, 882 F.3d 1163 (finding CDA immunity, but not
addressing First Amendment protection for defendant intermediary in a content moderation
case).
245
See supra notes 136–140.
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for systematically blocking pro-democracy content, specifically that
of the plaintiffs.246 In response, Baidu asserted that the First Amendment provides protection for editorial judgments, including the information appearing in the search results and how it was displayed.247
In Langdon v. Google, Google asserted both Section 230 and the
First Amendment as defenses.248 On the Section 230 front, the court
agreed with Google’s assertion that the “screening and deletion” of
content fell within the scope of immunity for “editorial decisions.”249 Additionally, under the First Amendment, the plaintiff received a second layer of protection for their exercise of “editorial
control and judgment,” and “freedom to exercise subjective editorial
discretion.”250
The plaintiffs in Langdon and Kinderstart both asserted that
their First Amendment rights had been violated by the defendant
intermediaries’ content moderation decisions.251 The underlying basis of these assertions aligns with the emergent idea that as “virtual
public squares,” online intermediaries should be liable for restricting
constitutionally protected speech on their platforms.252 The arguments were rejected in both cases.253
B. Editorializing by Intermediaries
Upon comparing the Section 230 and First Amendment lines of
cases, one common thread emerges: courts’ willingness to conceptualize intermediaries’ activity as “editorializing.” When courts confer immunity under Section 230 it is because the intermediaries are
performing editorial tasks in connection with their publisher
roles.254 When they receive immunity under the First Amendment,
it is sometimes because their actions are protected editorial
246

Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 438.
248
474 F. Supp. 2d at 629–30.
249 Id. at 630.
250 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
251 See id. at 626; see also Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C-06-2057, 2007
WL 831806, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007).
252
See Lakier, supra note 78.
253 See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 632; Kinderstart.com, 2007 WL 831806, at *15.
254
See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 67 (2d Cir. 2019).
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judgments.255 However, other times it is because the intermediaries’
actions are simply expressions of an opinion—also protected by the
First Amendment, but for a different reason.256
In sum, the intermediary’s activity shapes the defense it chooses
to raise and will receive. As has been shown, where intermediaries
are sued for a straight forward post by a third party on their forum
website, Section 230 predominates.257 Similarly, intermediaries
sued for third-party use of their electronic forms will take shelter
under Section 230, not the First Amendment.258 There exists a subset
of intermediaries who display or rework information in relatively
minor ways, employing “neutral” algorithms to perform “editorial
act[s].”259 These intermediaries turn to Section 230 as well.260 There
is no clear path for intermediaries who engage in content moderation—they may turn to the First Amendment, Section 230, or
both.261 When it comes to algorithms that amplify content for all, as
in Search King, the First Amendment protection for opinions has
received some acceptance as a defense.262 However, when a content
personalization algorithm came before the court in Force v. Facebook, Section 230 was the defense used, and little mention was made
of the First Amendment.263
It stands to reason, then, that the nexus between the intermediary’s activity and the protection it receives for “editorial” functions
will help instruct how each law should apply to online intermediaries.
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See Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
See Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL
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See supra notes 190–205 and accompanying text.
259 See Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1270–71 (D.C.
Cir. 2019) (quoting Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 2014)) (citing
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260 See id. at 1272; see also supra notes 210–220.
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1. Editorial Judgments in First Amendment Cases
The basis for First Amendment protection in editorial judgments
arose in the print media context in the 1970s.264 Perhaps the earliest
cases signaling protection for editorial judgments were those turning
on compelled speech issues, such as Miami Herald Publishing v.
Tornillo,265 Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC,266 and Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston.267 These
cases established that entities could not be forced to speak, and
thereby turned on the specific editorial choice to publish content.268
However, the Supreme Court’s language in Tornillo helped support
a more expansive understanding of the protections the First Amendment provides for editors.269 In ruling, the court in Baidu demonstrated the breadth of editorial protections, stating that the First
Amendment protections apply “whether or not the speaker articulates, or even has, a coherent or precise message, and whether or not
the speaker generated the underlying content in the first place.”270
There are also a handful of cases where the intermediaries in
question received First Amendment protection, but not for exercising editorial judgments. For instance, in Search King, Google successfully asserted First Amendment protection after the court found
the relative importance of a search engine’s results was a “statement
of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation.”271 Because the plaintiffs

264

See Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (describing “[t]he
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the
size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—whether
fair or unfair,” as constituting editorial judgments).
265
Id.
266 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
267
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
268 Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Mia.
Herald, 418 U.S. 241 and Turner, 512 U.S. 622, for the proposition that the respective right
of reply statutes “infringed on the newspaper’s First Amendment right to exercise ‘editorial
control and judgment,’” and later referencing Hurley, 515 U.S. 557, saying it “reinforced
that principle, and extended it well beyond the newspaper context.”).
269 See Mia. Herald, 418 U.S. at 258.
270
Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437.
271 Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at
*2 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (internal quotations omitted).
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were unable to successfully argue that the results were not objectively verifiable, First Amendment protection was granted.272
In general, First Amendment law surrounding online intermediaries’ implementation of algorithms has begun to take shape.273
However, as noted above, the rationale supporting the proposition
that the First Amendment protects search engine results is far from
uniform.274 Ultimately, the editorial judgment of deciding whether
to post content has received limited recognition; the apparently
stronger and constitutionally protected argument is one where the
intermediary asserts its opinion on relevance.
2. Editorial Functions in Section 230 Cases
While First Amendment protections for editorial judgements are
alive and well today, the advent of Section 230 brought with it a
distinct, new layer of protection for editors and editorial activity.
This is because the definition of “editorial” within the Section 230
context has adapted and morphed through the years as technology
has grown and changed. The result has been a definition of “editorial
activity” that covers activities seemingly outside the scope of anything First Amendment jurisprudence would recognize as editorial.
To be clear, the words “edit,” “editorializing,” “editor,” or “editorial,” never appear in Section 230.275 Rather, Section 230(c)(1)
reads, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.”276
When the court in Zeran v. America Online, Inc. was faced with
implementing Section 230 for the first time, it used language related
to editing.277 In an oft-cited line, the court stated that under Section

272

Id. at *4.
See, e.g., e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274
(M.D. Fla. 2016); Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 440; Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 630–31 (D. Del. 2007); Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C-062057, 2007 WL 831806, at *13–16 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Search King, Inc., 2003 WL
21464568, at *2.
274 See supra notes 129–141 and accompanying text.
275
See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
276 Id. § 230(c)(1).
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129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
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230, suits “seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise
of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are
barred.”278 In this way, the Zeran court broke “a publisher’s traditional editorial functions” into four categories: deciding whether to
(1) publish, (2) edit, (3) withdraw, or (4) postpone publishing.279 Zeran turned on defendant AOL’s decision regarding the third editorial
function—whether to withdraw an offensive post.280 The decision to
withdraw content has since been recognized as “the very essence of
publishing.”281 However, the second publisher function the Zeran
court identified—editorial decision-making—took on a life of its
own in the years to come.
One such extension of judicial understanding of online “editorial
functions” was described in the discussion of cases dealing with the
use of “automated editorial” algorithms.282 For instance, in Marshall’s Locksmith Service, Inc. v. Google, LLC, the conversion of
third-party information into a pinpoint on a map was considered an
“automated editorial act.”283 These acts, while not squarely within
the scope of the rule articulated in Zeran—which was limited to decisions on “whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter” publication of content284—seem to flow naturally from the concept of
“publishing” in the abstract.
While the automated editorial algorithm cases demonstrate a
slight expansion of judicial understanding of Section 230 editing
performed by intermediaries, there are other cases that strain the
limits of what should be considered a “traditional editorial function.” For instance, the court in Jones v. Dirty World stated that posting otherwise non-actionable comments on third-party users’ posts

278

Id.; see Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330).
279
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
280 Id.
281 Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
282 Marshall’s Locksmith Serv., Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1271 (D.C. Cir.
2019).
283
Id.; see also O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016)
(characterizing decisions related to formatting text as “traditional editorial functions”).
284
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (emphasis added).
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was a Section 230-protected, editorial function.285 It remains unclear
which of the four aforementioned categories of a publisher’s editorial functions this activity may have fallen under. Recently, in Force
v. Facebook, the court made no attempt to engage with the foundational editorial judgment case, Zeran, despite deciding Facebook’s
matchmaking algorithms fell within the scope of “editorial decisions.”286 Relying on Marshall’s Locksmith Service and O’Kroley,
as well as the sweeping immunity for editorial processes articulated
in Carafano,287 the court stated that deciding where third-party content should be placed was an editorial decision.288 Even though Facebook was targeting content to users with direct specificity, this did
not take its matchmaking algorithms out of Section 230’s protection.289
Additionally, the way courts speak about editorial activities by
intermediaries in the Section 230 context has shifted noticeably over
time. For instance, in 2003, the Carafano court essentially bypassed
the editorial inquiry, paving the way for Section 230 immunity for
other intermediaries who employed online forms.290 Six years later
in Nemet Chevrolet v. Consumeraffairs.com, the court dismissed
Chevrolet’s complaint in part because Chevrolet failed to allege the
defendant was engaged in “something more than a website operator
performs as part of its traditional editorial function.”291 Further, the
“editing” language initially stated in Zeran has transformed into
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755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2014).
See generally 934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019).
287 See Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 399 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
infra note 290 and accompanying text.
288 See Force, 934 F.3d at 66.
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Id. at 67.
290 See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124 (concluding “[u]nder § 230(c) . . . so long as a thirdparty willingly provides the essential published content, the interactive service provider
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Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 650 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (citing with approval
Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119).
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language related to “editorial decisions”292 and “editorial functions.”293 In many cases, this language appears to encompass all
publisher activity as specified in Zeran—collapsing both the publisher inquiry and the editorial function inquiry into one.294
C. Summarizing the Problem
1. An Expanded but Vague Understanding of “Editorializing”
for Intermediaries
The emphasis on editor activity has become far more involved
than the simple mention of “the decision whether to publish, withdraw, postpone, or alter content,” as originally set forth in Zeran.295
This has led to a lack of clarity in the law and a potentially, overly
broad understanding of which online intermediary activities should
be covered under Section 230. These impacts exacerbate the fact
that the First Amendment, both explicitly and through the policy of
“speech promotion,” runs alongside the Section 230 inquiry—but is
kept blocked off and underdeveloped due to the procedural protection that Section 230 provides.296 As a result, case law interpreting
Section 230—a law whose express language prohibits treating an
online intermediary as a publisher—has transformed Section 230
into a law that provides affirmative protection for an intermediary
performing editorial functions. This would not be much cause for
concern on its face. However, the trouble lies in the fact that what
constitutes an editorial judgment under Section 230 has proven itself
to be a fluid concept, continuing to transform to fit the changing capabilities of modern online intermediaries, all the while purporting
to be rooted in notions of “traditional” editor responsibilities. As a
consequence of this fluid understanding of editor activity in the Section 230 context, the following are all examples of “traditional editorial” functions performed by online intermediaries: (1) the
292

e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 1265, 1274 (M.D. Fla.
2016).
293 O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Jones v. Dirty
World Ent. Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2014)).
294 See, e.g., Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007)
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See supra notes 144–149.
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decision to withdraw an offensive post; (2) an electronic form; (3)
an algorithm that converts addresses to pinpoints on a map; (4) an
algorithm that automates decisions on font and ellipses placement;
and (5) a matchmaking algorithm that suggests users as friends to
each other after tracking online habits and interests. It is becoming
increasingly clear that without any clearly demarcated barriers, the
“editorial” umbrella runs the risk of becoming a fluid, conclusory
catch-all.
2. Dual Protection Under Section 230 and the First
Amendment
The broad “editorial” activities umbrella becomes doubly problematic when one considers the First Amendment’s shadowy—but
almost non-existent—role in the majority of these cases. That is,
while courts briefly mention First Amendment concerns underlying
Section 230 and laud the benefits of free speech on the internet when
granting intermediaries immunity, Section 230 has ironically
shielded the First Amendment itself from actually playing a substantive role in these cases. As Eric Goldman points out, Section 230
acts as a procedural shield, preventing these cases from ever being
heard on First Amendment grounds to begin with.297 Since intermediaries are awarded quasi-First Amendment protection for editorial
judgments regardless, intermediaries need not assert their actions
are either opinions nor editorial decisions within the meaning of the
First Amendment. Rather, they can seek shelter under what appears
to be a more flexible and ever-shifting, “editorial judgment” standard under Section 230.
The ambiguity surrounding “editorial” activities under Section
230 has borne considerable uncertainty in an already misunderstood
and hotly contested area of the law. Moreover, the lack of a clearly
articulated standard to determine when an activity is “editorial” has
led to conclusory judicial opinions that turn on each court’s wildly
variable notion of what exactly an online editor “traditionally” does.
The affirmative protection for editorial decisions under Section 230
further serves to muddy the law surrounding online intermediaries
and First Amendment speech—which is already stunted by Section
297

See supra notes 145–149.
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230 through procedural means. Finally, the expansive understanding
of the “editor” under Section 230 serves to provide intermediaries
with a dual layer of editor-related protection if the sites can successfully argue they perform editor-adjacent activities.
III. SOLUTION GOING FORWARD: ADOPT ZERAN’S LANGUAGE AS
THE RULE
A. Return to the Original Language in Zeran
Courts should return to the language in Zeran when deciding
whether an activity is editorial. In Zeran, the court listed four main
publisher functions under Section 230: (1) publishing, (2) editing,
(3) withdrawing, and (4) postponing publishing.298 When a case involves editorial conduct, that conduct should be protected, but only
insofar as it is confined to editing behavior in its traditional sense.
Online activities implicating editorial functions only in spirit or by
analogy should receive a seriously close look if they are to be afforded protection. Although Facebook’s matchmaking algorithm
bears nebulous similarities to traditional editors in that they both incidentally form connections between speakers of content and viewers of content, perhaps this high-level, incidental similarity, without
more, should not be enough to bring the intermediary under Section
230’s protection.
B. Use First Amendment Jurisprudence as a Guide for
Determining What Is a Traditional Editorial Function
Further, when courts invoke the idea of a “traditional” editorial
function, they should be guided by First Amendment jurisprudence,
which spells out, “[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper,
and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of
the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials—
whether fair or unfair,”299 as hallmark features of editorial functions.
First Amendment considerations already guide Section 230 jurisprudence in this area, so these explicit examples of traditional editorial
activities are instructive.
298
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See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
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If the contours of Section 230 are to be clarified and solidified
in this way, intermediaries engaging in an activity that is not clearly
within the language or intent of Section 230 would be incentivized
to make arguments more consistent with their actual functions. They
would need to assert their actions are either editorial judgments or
opinions deserving First Amendment protection—rather than getting the easy ride of saying their activity falls into the vast, amorphous bucket that is an “editorial decision” or “editorial function”
under Section 230.
In short, courts can address concerns of Section 230’s expanding
scope by harkening back to the language of Zeran—language that
forms the basis for immunity for editorial judgments under Section
230 as we know it—while keeping intact the understanding that the
decision “to edit” is one typically associated with a publisher.
C. Reasons for and Against the Proposed Solution
This proposed rule would benefit judges and litigants alike by
providing increased clarity and predictability in a confusing and unpredictable area of law. It would allow all parties involved to assess
with greater confidence whether an activity falls within the scope of
Section 230—and tailor their decisions accordingly. Another key
benefit lies in allowing First Amendment jurisprudence in this area
to finally develop where appropriate.
Some may oppose a more concrete rule such as this one, as it
would mean that Section 230’s potential scope would likely be narrowed. Those who laud Section 230 for protecting defendant intermediaries—for instance by allowing speedier dismissals and lower
litigation costs—would likely protest as well.
However, these concerns (about protecting more advanced
online intermediary activities, for instance) could be addressed more
directly and with greater clarity through an independent piece of legislation. The case law and public criticism in the legislature and judiciary make clear that continuing to stretch a law implemented two
years before Google was created and eight years before Facebook
was created, is not a sustainable way to provide immunity for notoriously complicated and arguably insidious, novel technologies implemented by powerful actors.
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CONCLUSION
Rather than continue to engage in the convoluted reasoning required to argue that a matchmaking algorithm is a “traditional editorial function,” courts should allow Section 230 to reach only what
it was meant to reach—truly basic and traditional editorial functions,
as defined in the seminal case of Zeran v. America Online, Inc.

